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Entry Policy in Local Telecommunications
Iowa Utilities and Verizon
Douglas Lichtman and Randal C. Picker*
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires, among other things,
that incumbent local telephone carriers lease parts of their telephone
networks to would-be rivals.1 If you have children, you can easily imagine the difficulties inherent in this approach; mandated sharing is often
contentious when forced upon young kids and is no easier as applied to
firms with strong, contradictory interests. These problems are exacerbated in the telecommunications setting by imprecision in the rules of
the game. As Justice Scalia put it AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board,2
“[i]t would be gross understatement to say that the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 is not a model of clarity. It is in many important respects a
model of ambiguity or indeed even self-contradiction.”3
However complicated the legal provisions, the intuition behind
them is straightforward: the purpose of mandatory sharing is to facilitate
competition. Without mandatory sharing, a competitor can enter the
market only if it can either cut a deal with an existing telephone company or build its own network from the ground up. With mandatory
sharing, by contrast, a competitor has a third option: it can enter the

* Copyright © 2002, Douglas Lichtman and Randal C. Picker. All Rights Reserved. Respectively, Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School; and Paul and Theo Leffmann
Professor of Commercial Law, The University of Chicago Law School and Senior Fellow, The
Computation Institute of the University of Chicago and Argonne National Laboratory. We
thank the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics at The University of Chicago Law
School for its generous research support, and, through their support of the Olin Program,
Merck & Co., Inc.; Microsoft Corp.; and Pfizer, Inc. We also thank Stuart Benjamin, Richard
Epstein, Howard Shelanski, and Jim Speta for helpful comments, Pat Curran for research
assistance, and participants in a workshop sponsored by the Manhattan Institute’s Center for
the Digital Economy and entitled “Competition Policy in the Telecom Industry: When the
Sherman Act Meets the Telecommunications Act, Who Wins?”.
1 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 56 (1996), §§ 251-52, as
codified at 47 USC §§ 251–52 (2002).
2 525 US 366 (1999).
3 Id at 397.
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market in stages, building part of its network itself but then leasing the
rest at regulated rates from existing firms. The competitor can later
choose to build out its network more fully, for example if its original
offering has helped it to establish market share, to develop some relevant
expertise, or to accumulate necessary financial resources. Alternatively,
the competitor can continue to compete along only the narrower dimension, borrowing most network elements from the incumbent and in that
way focusing its competitive energies on some small subset of the relevant infrastructure.
The mandatory sharing provisions of the 1996 Act have generated a
flood of litigation in the past six years, in part because these provisions
represent a sweeping change in the regulatory landscape. Prior to 1996,
local telephone regulation had proceeded under the assumption that
each community should be served by one and only one local telephone
carrier. That carrier was subject to regulation so as to ensure that its
prices remained low and the quality of its service remained high. But
competition was not encouraged. It was expensive enough to have one
firm build a local telephone network connecting every home and business in the community; policymakers deemed it ridiculous to encourage
a second or third firm to duplicate that infrastructure.
The 1996 Act turned this conventional wisdom on its head. Gone
was the assumption that regulated monopoly is the best approach to
local telephone service. Replacing it was a firm commitment to competition. That commitment reveals itself throughout the 1996 Act, for example in a provision requiring that existing telephone carriers exchange
traffic with new entrants,4 and in a provision forbidding state authorities
from adopting regulations that favor one local telephone company at the
expense of another.5 But the central and most controversial procompetitive provisions of the 1996 Act are those that create the abovedescribed regime of mandatory shared infrastructure. Insiders term these
the “unbundled network element” (UNE) provisions; and twice already
these provisions have been subject to Supreme Court review.
In the first case, the aforementioned Iowa Utilities, the Court considered whether the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had
4 47 USC § 251(c)(2).
5 47 USC § 253 (2002).
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been faithful to the 1996 Act when it promulgated a regulation identifying the specific network elements that an incumbent telephone company
has to share with rival firms.6 The incumbent firms argued that the
Commission had applied too lax a standard. According to them, the
right standard would have required sharing only if a given element was
an “essential facility” as that phrase is used in antitrust law.7 The Court
rejected this argument on grounds that a telecom-specific standard
might better accomplish the 1996 Act’s goals. But the Court did find
that “the Act requires the FCC to apply some limiting standard”—
something the Commission, in the eyes of the Court, had “simply failed
to do.”8
The Court’s specific criticisms centered on the Commission’s interpretation of section 251(d)(2), a provision that instructs the Commission to “consider, at a minimum, whether (A) access to such network
elements as are proprietary in nature is necessary; and (B) the failure to
provide access to such network elements would impair the ability of the
telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the services that it
seeks to offer.”9 According to the Court, the Commission eviscerated
the first of these criteria by interpreting it “as having been met regardless
of whether ‘requesting carriers can obtain the requested proprietary element from a source other than the incumbent’”10 and similarly eviscerated the second by deeming competition impaired if “the failure of an
incumbent to provide access to [some specific] network element would
decrease the quality, or increase the financial or administrative cost of
the service a requesting carrier seeks to offer, compared with providing
6 Iowa Utilities addressed other issues as well, including jurisdictional questions about whether
the Act empowers the federal government, through the Federal Communications Commission,
or state government, through local public utilities commissions, to take the lead in coordinating
various aspects of mandatory sharing. We do not focus on the jurisdictional issues in this Article, but interested readers are invited to consult Stuart Benjamin, Douglas Lichtman and Howard Shelanski, Telecommunications Law and Policy 731-35 (Carolina, 2001) (“Telecommunications Law & Policy”).
7 525 US at 388.
8 Id.
9 47 USC § 251(d)(2).
10 525 US at 389, quoting FCC, In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Rcd 15499 (1996) (“First Report & Order”) at ¶ 283.
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that service over other unbundled elements.”11 The Court therefore vacated the Commission’s rule as unreasonable under even the generous
standards of Chevron deference.12
The second case, last Term’s Verizon Communications v. Federal
Communications Commission,13 raised two primary objections to the procedure that the Commission had established for determining the price at
which various network elements will be made available for mandatory
sharing. The first objection was that the Commission’s procedure did
not sufficiently track the relevant statutory language. The 1996 Act does
not say much about prices, but it does say that a “just and reasonable
rate” should be “based on the cost” of the shared facility, should be
“nondiscriminatory,” and “may include a reasonable profit.”14 The incumbent local telephone carriers argued that the Commission’s rule did
not satisfy these commands, the objection being that the Commission’s
approach—a forward-looking cost methodology known as “total element long-run incremental cost” or TELRIC—was not “based on cost”
because, among other things, it defined cost to mean the expense that
would be incurred were an equivalent network built today instead of
adopting the arguably more conventional definition that cost means actual monies spent.15 The Court ultimately found that the Commission’s
interpretation was reasonable on this score, or, less enthusiastically, that
it was “reasonably within the pale of statutory possibility.”16
The incumbents’ second objection was that the Commission’s pricing methodology, if deemed permissible under the statute, would result
in regulated prices so low as to constitute a taking of the incumbents’
property without just compensation, a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. This, the incumbents argued, justified application

11 525 US at 389 (italics omitted), quoting First Report & Order at ¶ 285 (cited in note 10).
12 Chevron USA, Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837 (1984). The Commission rewrote its rules after the remand, with no more success. See United States Telecom Ass’n
v FCC, 290 F3d 415 (DC Cir 2002).
13 122 S Ct 1646 (2002).
14 47 USC § 252(d).
15 47 CFR § 51.505 (1997).
16 122 S Ct at 1687.
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of the rule of constitutional avoidance; in essence, the Court should interpret the 1996 Act to preclude the Commission’s pricing methodology
in order to avoid a serious constitutional question. The Court was not
convinced that a serious constitutional question was in the offing, however, mainly because the Commission’s pricing methodology is so flexible that, even knowing what it is, it is still almost impossible to guess
whether the resulting prices will be high or low, let alone so unconstitutionally low as to set up a possible takings argument.17 The Court noted
that this conclusion was consistent with its “general rule” of not considering “a taking challenge on ratesetting methodology without being presented with specific rate orders alleged to be confiscatory.”18
This account covers a great deal of law and policy, and obviously we
will unpack it with care below. But before we delve too deeply into that
analysis, we should make clear that we think the Commission in promulgating the regulations at issue in these two cases, and the Court in
analyzing those regulations in light of both the 1996 Act and the Constitution, performed admirably. The 1996 Act gave the Commission
only six months to promulgate all of the regulations needed to implement network element unbundling.19 Viewed in that light, the rules that
the Commission produced20 and the document that attempts to explain
and justify them21 represent a substantial accomplishment. Similarly,
while we think that the Court made some missteps in Iowa Utilities and
Verizon, overall the Court’s analysis in both of these cases strikes us reasonable and likely even right. The economic issues at the core of these
cases were complicated and at times ambiguous; and the Court in our
view exercised good judgment in deciding when to wade into the morass
and when to defer technical issues to the Commission.
Our purpose in this Article, then, is not to criticize either the
Commission or the Court. Instead, we set out here to move the analysis
17 Id at 1679.
18 Id.
19 47 USC § 251(d)(1).
20 See, in particular, 47 CFR § 51.317 (1997) (standards for identifying network elements to
be made available); 47 CFR § 51.319 (1997) (specific unbundling requirements); 47 CFR
§§ 51.501-51.515 (2002) (establishing pricing rules for unbundled network elements).
21 First Report & Order (cited in note 10).
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forward by highlighting some possible mistakes, raising some overlooked issues, and along the way clarifying exactly what is at stake in
these battles over the form and substance of the 1996 Act’s unbundling
regime. Our hope is that the ideas presented here will amount to more
than just a post-mortem on two interesting and important Supreme
Court cases. Indeed, we hope that our discussion helps to inform the
on-going legal and regulatory process put in motion by these cases and
still underway at the Commission and in, among others, the Second,
Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits.22
We proceed as follows. In Section I, we explain the key sharing
rules established by the 1996 Act and parse in some detail the Court’s
analysis of those rules in Iowa Utilities and Verizon. In Section II, we
consider more conceptually the main reasons why sharing rules are
sometimes imposed in markets like the market for local telephone service, focusing in particular on the problem of natural monopoly and its
implications for both market entry and government regulation. In Section III, we point out the three main differences between the sharing
rules promulgated under the 1996 Act and the rules that were in place
prior to 1996. In Section IV, we present some data on how all this regulation has begun to unfold in practice. Finally, in Section V, we use the
preceding analysis to look forward from Iowa Utilities and Verizon, offering our thoughts on how these cases will influence the regulatory and
legal landscape in the coming years.
I. Iowa Utilities and Verizon
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 is wide-ranging, but among its
most important provisions are those designed, in the FCC’s words, “to
let anyone enter any communications business—to let any communications business compete in any market against any other.”23 This might
22 See, for example, Iowa Utilities Board v FCC, 219 F.3d 744, 757 (8th Cir 2000) (continued
proceedings in light of Iowa Utilities); United States Telecom Ass’n. v FCC, 290 F3d 415 (DC
Cir 2002) (judicial review of the Commission’s revised list of elements to be unbundled);
Goldwasser v Ameritech Corp., 222 F3d 390 (7th Cir 2000) (analysis of relationship between the
unbundling requirements and federal antitrust law); Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko v Bell Atlantic Corp., 305 F3d 89 (2nd Cir 2002) (same).
23

See

FCC,

Telecommunications

Act
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1996,
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sound like an obvious objective; but in the early days of telecommunications regulation, competition was in fact restricted in telecommunications markets for fear that it would mean wasteful duplication of telecommunications resources and, worse, the possibility of competing but
incompatible telephone networks.24
Granted, that view had lost some ground even before the 1996 Act.
In the 1950’s, for example, the Commission embraced competition by
authorizing the use of telephone handsets purchased in the marketplace,
rejecting the earlier view that telephone handsets were part of the telephone network and thus had to be rented from the telephone company
itself.25 Similarly, in the 1980’s, the Commission joined forces with the
Department of Justice and used a combination of regulation and antitrust litigation to open the long distance market to competition, this
time by requiring local telephone companies to work with all the various
long distance firms instead of each just picking a favored partner.26
But the market for local telephone service had been left untouched
by these and related changes. Simply put, it was expensive to build a
fully functional local telephone network, and having a single network
sufficed in terms of being able to provide adequate service to every interested home and business. Given that, policymakers saw little reason to
encourage the construction of a second or third overlapping infrastructure. The 1996 Act thus represented a significant shift in telecommunications policy. The new goal was to encourage competition even in the
local market, at least to whatever extent the economics of the industry
would allow.
<http://www.fcc.gov/telecom.html> (visited November 1, 2002).
24 See Telecommunications Law & Policy at 614-21 (cited in note 6). It is possible that incompatible local telephone networks would benefit society by spurring innovation and encouraging quality service. See Milton L. Mueller, Jr., Universal Service: Competition, Interconnection,
and Monopoly in the Making of the American Telephone System (MIT & AEI, 1997).
25 See Hush-A-Phone v United States, 238 F2d 266 (DC Cir 1956); Use of the Carterfone Device
in Message Toll Service, 14 FCC 2d 571 (1968); Use of Recording Devices in Connection with
Telephone Services, 11 FCC 1033 (1947). For discussion, see Telecommunications Law & Policy at 624-28 (cited in note 6).
26 See United States v American Telephone & Telegraph, 552 F Supp 131 (DC Cir 1982), aff’d,
460 US 1001 (1983); In re MTS and WATS Market Structure Phase III, 100 FCC 2d 860
(1985). For discussion, see Glen Robinson, The Titanic Remembered: AT&T and the Changing
World of Telecommunications, 5 Yale J Reg 517 (1988).
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Some of the 1996 Act’s mechanisms for encouraging competition
are easy to understand. One set of provisions, for instance, obligates all
existing telecommunications carriers to exchange traffic with each other
and with any new entrants.27 This is important since a new entrant—a
“competitive local exchange carrier” or CLEC in telecommunications
jargon—can attract customers only if it can guarantee that its subscribers
will be able to communicate with existing telephone users. Another set
of provisions facilitates competition by allowing a CLEC to resell under
its own name services that are in fact provided by another firm.28 This
makes it easy for a new firm to enter the market, especially since services
can be purchased at cheap “wholesale rates” if purchased from an “incumbent local exchange carrier” (ILEC)—telecom-speak for a local
telephone company that was already in business at the time the 1996
Act took effect.29
The most important mechanism, however—and the one of most interest in both Iowa Utilities and Verizon—requires incumbent local telephone carriers to share, at regulated rates and with any interested firm,
certain components used in their networks. For example, suppose that
the existing local telephone network in a given community uses copper
wires to connect local homes to some centralized automatic switch. Under the 1996 Act, the ILEC that owns those wires must allow any interested competitor to use them. The idea is to give new entrants the opportunity to enter the market without requiring that each entrant build
its own entire telecom network right from the start. Using unbundled
network elements, firms can enter the market gradually, providing some
network elements on their own but leasing the rest from the relevant
incumbent firm.
The 1996 Act only sketches the rough contours of this unbundled
network element mechanism. Indeed, as we have mentioned, one critical
provision sets out the standards that the Commission should use when

27 See 47 USC § 251(a)(1) (general obligation of interconnection); 47 USC § 251(c)(2) (more
detailed interconnection obligation for incumbents). For discussion, see Telecommunications
Law & Policy at 715-18 (cited in note 6).
28 See 47 USC § 251(b)(1) (resale obligation for all firms); 47 USC § 251(c)(4) (specific obligation for incumbents).
29 See 47 USC § 252(d)(3) (defining wholesale rates for purposes of § 251(c)(4)).
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deciding which network elements must be made available for lease, but
that provision states only that the Commission should “consider, at a
minimum, whether access to such network elements as are proprietary in
nature is necessary” and also whether “the failure to provide access . . .
would impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the services it seeks to offer.”30 Another central but
vague provision is the pricing provision also mentioned earlier, which
states in relevant part that the price should be “based on the cost” of the
relevant network element and “may include a reasonable profit.”31
All that left much of the hard work to the Federal Communications
Commission, as it was to promulgate the rules that would implement
these ambiguous and complicated provisions. And for all of the uncertainty about how to actually read the Act, Congress left no doubt as to
when the FCC was to complete its work implementing the core sharing
rules; the 1996 Act required that the Commission issue the relevant implementing regulations within six months of the statute’s enactment.32
Somewhat miraculously given the enormity of the task, the FCC met
the deadline, issuing the relevant regulations on August 8, 1996.33 The
litigation that ultimately led to both Supreme Court challenges began
shortly thereafter.
A. Iowa Utilities
One of the main issues in contention in Iowa Utilities was the question
of whether the Commission exercised reasonable discretion when it
promulgated a rule identifying seven specific network elements that
every incumbent would have to unbundle.34 Incumbent local exchange
carriers argued that the Commission had applied too lenient a standard
when identifying those seven elements. For example, the incumbents
argued that the Commission had not adequately considered the possibility that entrants can purchase some elements through voluntary transac-

30 47 USC § 251(d)(2).
31 47 USC § 252(d).
32 47 USC § 251(d)(1).
33 See First Report and Order (cited in note 10).
34 47 CFR § 51.319 (1997).
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tions, a consideration that might argue against mandatory unbundling
with respect to those elements. The Court was largely receptive to these
challenges and ultimately vacated the challenged rule; but, before we
explain why, it might be helpful to first set out and analyze the relevant
legal provisions, namely sections 251(c)(3) and 251(d)(2) of the 1996
Act.
Section 251(c)(3) sets forth the basic requirement that incumbent
local exchange carriers “provide, to any requesting telecommunications
carrier . . . access to network elements on an unbundled basis at any
technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that are just,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.”35 When Iowa Utilities was litigated
in the Eighth Circuit, there was some dispute over what the phrase “at
any technically feasible point” means.36 The Commission thought that
the phrase creates a presumption that every element should be unbundled so long as unbundling is technically feasible.37 Incumbent carriers
thought that the phrase merely defines where—namely, at technically
feasible points—unbundling should take place.38 The Eighth Circuit
ultimately sided with the incumbents39 and the Commission did not
challenge that decision in the Supreme Court,40 and thus today the accepted reading of section 251(c)(3) is that it creates a general unbundling obligation without in any way specifying exactly what should be
unbundled.41
35 47 USC § 251(c)(3).
36 Iowa Utilities Board v FCC, 120 F3d 753, 810 (8th Cir 1997).
37 525 US at 391.
38 Id.
39 120 F3d at 810.
40 525 US at 391.
41 Note that the Supreme Court could have vacated and remanded the Commission’s unbundling rules on this ground alone. The argument would have been that the Commission’s admitted error in interpreting section 251(c)(3) infected all of its regulations; in essence, the Commission had started the process with a presumption in favor of unbundling and then looked for
reasons not to unbundle instead of starting with a blank slate and looking for reasons to unbundle. The Court did not vacate on this ground, however, perhaps out of a suspicion that the
two approaches in the end lead to the same basic results. This conclusion is bolstered by a
comparison of the Commission’s original list of elements (47 CFR § 51.319 (1997)) with the
nearly identical list put forward on remand (47 CFR § 51.319 (2002)).
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Section 251(d)(2), by contrast, offers guidance as to which elements
should be included in the unbundling regime. Specifically, the provision
instructs the Commission to “consider, at a minimum, whether (A) access to such network elements as are proprietary in nature is necessary;
and (B) the failure to provide access to such network elements would
impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking access to
provide the services that it seeks to offer.”42 One way to think about this
provision is to see it as setting up a two-level standard: for elements that
involve some form of intellectual property, the Commission should ask
whether unbundling is “necessary,” whereas for non-proprietary elements the Commission should ask only whether a decision not to unbundle would somehow “impair” competition. Phrased another way,
Congress in this provision seems to be telling the Commission to be
especially reluctant to unbundle elements where patent, copyright,
trademark or trade secret protection is implicated—more reluctant than
the Commission would be under its normal, baseline standard.
But what is that baseline? Try three different formulations, all
seemingly consistent with the vague contours of section 251(d)(2). In
the first, the baseline for unbundling is that we should unbundle only in
instances where it is physically or economically impractical for an entrant to provide a given element itself or to acquire that element through
voluntary market transactions. This would be a relatively strict standard,
in that it would roughly shadow antitrust law’s essential facilities doctrine and thus would favor unbundling only in extreme situations. That
might make sense; and, indeed, the incumbents pushed for this interpretation in the Supreme Court.43 However, as we will see in a moment,
there are arguments in favor of mandatory access even in cases where
self-provision or voluntary transactions are plausible.
Try, then, a second formulation, namely that we should unbundle
even in cases where entry would otherwise be possible, the purpose being either to make it easier for firms to enter the market or to accelerate
entry into the market. The Commission was clearly sympathetic to at
least this latter idea of accelerating entry. In fact, at one point in the
document explaining its unbundling regulations, the Commission ex42 47 USC § 251(d)(2).
43 525 US at 388.
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plicitly stated that while “it is possible that there will be sufficient demand in some local telephone markets to support the construction of
competing local exchange facilities” at some point, those future competitors should “be able to use unbundled elements from the incumbent
[local exchange carriers] until such time as they complete construction
of their own networks.”44 Note that this articulation seems to let the
entrants determine when any transition takes place, although one could
easily imagine an alternative articulation where unbundling was an option only for a predefined transition period.
Consider, finally, a third formulation, namely that we should unbundle in instances where new entrants would otherwise provide their
own elements but those duplicative elements would represent social
waste. This interpretation harkens back to the old regulatory notion that
it is expensive to build certain parts of the local telephone network and it
is therefore ridiculous to encourage firms to duplicate that infrastructure. Unbundling on this view is necessary not because a given entrant
would not build its own facility, but rather because it would be socially
wasteful to have a second facility built. On this story, mandatory access—at sufficiently cheap prices—is a means by which to avoid the
needless duplication of facilities.
Again, section 251(d)(2) does not on its face dictate any particular
choice among these three formulations. And, in fact, the record suggests
that in some form the Commission thought about each of these articulations when crafting its unbundling rules.45 The question in Iowa Utilities was therefore whether, in the end, that thought process was sufficient; or, more specifically, whether the Commission had reasonably
interpreted Congress’s command that it “consider” whether access to
proprietary elements was necessary and whether the failure to provide

44 First Report & Order at ¶ 232 (cited in note 10).
45 See, for example, id at ¶ 286 (refusing to hold that incumbents “must provide unbundled
elements only when the failure to do so would prevent a carrier from offering a service,” thus
considering and rejecting the first articulation given in the text); id at ¶ 378 (noting that the
failure to unbundle a given element “would likely delay market entry and postpone the benefits
of local telephone competition for consumers,” the issues raised in our second articulation); and
id (noting that, in some instances, “preventing access to unbundled loops would . . . cause the
competitor to construct unnecessarily duplicative facilities, thereby misallocating societal resources,” our third concern).
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access to non-proprietary elements would impair a given entrant’s ability
to offer a particular telecommunications service.
Focus first on the direct command issued to the Commission,
namely that it consider the two factors at issue. The most natural interpretation of “consider” is just that: were the necessity and impair factors
thought about in defining the unbundling standards? So long as they
were—as they almost certainly were—the regulations would pass muster. Unsurprisingly, this is exactly how the Commission understood its
obligation under section 251(d)(2), concluding that “the word ‘consider’
means we must weigh the standards enumerated in section 251(d)(2) in
evaluating whether to require the unbundling of a particular element”46
and, later, that “the plain language of section 251(d)(2), and the standards articulated there, give us the discretion to limit the general obligation imposed by subsection 251(c)(3), but they do not require us to do
so.”47
Arguably, this was a reasonable interpretation of the law. After all,
Congress does from time to time order administrative agencies to include certain considerations in their deliberations. For example, the National Environmental Policy Act requires that federal agencies give environmental concerns “appropriate consideration in decisionmaking,” but
that Act does not itself impose any substantive standard on actual outcomes.48 Moreover, the “shall consider” formulation is used more than a
dozen times in federal communications laws,49 and in at least some of
those instances courts have interpreted the phrase to mean exactly what
the Commission says it meant here.50
46 Id at ¶ 280.
47 Id at ¶ 286.
48 42 USC § 4332 (2002). See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v Karlen, 444 US 223
(1980).
49 See, for example, 47 USC §§ 154(a)(3), 160(b), 226(e)(2), 227(b)(2), 251(d)(2), 254(c)(1),
273(e)(1)(A), 311(b), 325(b)(3)(A), 332(a), 332(c)(1)(C), 534(g)(2), 543(c)(2), 544a(c)(1),
548(c)(4), 610(b)(3) (2002).
50 In a dispute over cable television rates, for example, the D.C. Circuit noted that the relevant
statute “by its terms merely requires the Commission to consider” several relevant factors. The
court went on to say that this means only that the Commission must “reach an express and
considered conclusion about the bearing of [each] factor, but is not required to give any specific
weight” to those factors. Time Warner Entertainment Co. v FCC, 56 F3d 151, 175 (DC Cir
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The Commission pressed this argument—that it need only consider
necessity and impairment and that it had done so—in the Supreme
Court,51 but the Court’s decision does not explicitly address it. We must
admit that we are a little puzzled by that. The argument seems strong
enough to warrant serious discussion, especially given the fact that, if
accepted, it would leave the Commission’s rule fully intact, a result directly opposite the one ultimately reached in the case. The best defense
of what the Court did would be to say that the Commission’s interpretations of the necessary and impair standards were so misguided that the
Commission cannot fairly be said to have considered these factors. That
would explain why the Court went ahead and analyzed the substance of
the Commission’s interpretations; and it is to that substance that we
now turn.
The Court raised two fundamental concerns about the Commission’s interpretations. The first was that, in the Court’s view, the Commission had ignored the possibility that some elements can be obtained
in the market or built by would-be entrants. As we have already explained, it might make sense to unbundle even if a given element can be
built anew or acquired through voluntary transactions; for instance, the
purpose of unbundling might be to discourage wasteful duplication by
offering entrants cheap access to existing infrastructure. But the question of whether a given element can be acquired through voluntary
transactions or built anew is certainly relevant to the section 251(d)(2)
inquiry. The Court was therefore troubled by what it perceived as a
Commission completely insensitive to these possibilities.
In truth, the evidence on this point was mixed. Yes, when the
Commission announced its interpretation of the “necessary” standard,
the Commission did say that a proprietary element is necessary unless
the “requesting telecommunications carrier could offer the same proposed telecommunications service through the use of other, nonproprietary
unbundled network elements” borrowed from the incumbent’s network.52
1995) (interpreting 47 USC § 543(c)(2)) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
51 See Reply Brief for the Federal Petitioners and Brief for the Federal Cross-Respondents at 43-44
(“Reply Brief”) (available on Lexis).
52 47 CFR § 51.317 (1997) (emphasis added). This quotation is taken from Rule 317, a rule
that was promulgated alongside the rule explicitly at issue in Iowa Utilities, Rule 319. Rule 317
instructed state commissions in how to interpret the necessary and impair standard in the event
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That comparison captures what the Court saw as the Commission’s error; it compares the incumbent’s unbundled proprietary elements to the
incumbent’s unbundled non-proprietary elements, completely ignoring
elements not borrowed from the incumbent at all. Similarly, in interpreting the statutory language about impairment, the Commission held
that a requesting carrier would be impaired in its ability to provide a
given service if “the failure of an incumbent to provide access to a network element would decrease the quality, or increase the financial or
administrative cost of the service a requesting carrier seeks to offer, compared with providing that service over other unbundled elements” borrowed
from the incumbent’s network.53 Again, same problem: this articulation
compares unbundled elements to unbundled elements, failing to account
for elements that might be acquired outside the unbundling regime.
In the Commission’s defense, however, it is unfair to read too much
into those quotations. The Commission obviously did think about the
possibility that entrants would build elements themselves or purchase
elements in voluntary transactions. A few paragraphs back, for instance,
we quote the Commission as saying that “it is possible that there will be
sufficient demand in some local telephone markets to support the construction of competing local exchange facilities,”54 and surely that sentence recognizes that entrants can build their own networks. The Court
was therefore wrong to say that the Commission did not account for
these ideas in its analysis; the Court’s actual complaint is that the Commission did not build these ideas into the rules that were ultimately
promulgated.

that they were called upon to unbundle additional elements above and beyond those unbundled
on the federal level by the Commission. We quote this rule because it makes clear how the
Commission was interpreting the “necessary” and “impair” standard. The Iowa Utilities Court,
by contrast, quotes similar but more ambiguous language drawn from the document wherein
the Commission explains and justifies both Rule 317 and Rule 319. See 525 US at 389, quoting First Report & Order at ¶ 283 (cited in note 10). Note that, while the Supreme Court
ultimately vacated only Rule 319 and left Rule 317 intact, the Eighth Circuit on remand recognized the link between these two rules, going so far as to vacate Rule 317 on grounds that, if
Rule 319 was invalid, Rule 317 also could not stand. See Iowa Utilities Board v FCC, 219 F3d
744, 757 (8th Cir 2000).
53 First Report & Order at ¶ 285 (emphasis added) (cited in note 10). Cf. 47 CFR
§ 51.317(b)(2) (1997) (similar language used in Rule 317).
54 See note 46.
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If that is right, however, then it must be pointed out that the
Commission was under no legal or logical obligation to build these ideas
into its final rules. Suppose, for instance, that the Commission’s honest
evaluation of unbundling was that, in most instances, elements should
be unbundled even if they are also available through voluntary transactions. Suppose, further, that the Commission believed that the added
costs of distinguishing situations where that assumption works from
situations where it does not are high—both administratively and with
respect to the additional legal uncertainty imposed by a contingent
rule—and thus that the public interest was better served by a rule that
ignores the possibility of voluntary transactions. In such a case, the
Commission would have written rules exactly like those criticized in
Iowa Utilities, and yet the Commission would have indeed considered
voluntary market transactions in formulating its rules.
Turn attention for a moment to the Court’s second concern, namely
that neither of the Commission’s interpretations included an explicit
requirement that harms and differences be substantial. In the abovequoted language about impairment, for instance, the Commission concluded that a carrier is impaired in its ability to provide a given service if
“the failure of an incumbent to provide access to a network element
would decrease the quality, or increase the financial or administrative
cost of the service a requesting carrier seeks to offer.” That language
seems to imply that—no matter how small—any increase in cost or decrease in quality would be sufficient to justify unbundling. And that, the
Court objected, is an interpretation not sufficiently “in accord with the
ordinary and fair meaning” of the terms “necessary” and “impair.”55
Again, there is room to defend the Commission. A materiality requirement was surely implicit in the Commission’s analysis; after all, if
the Commission really believed that even trivial harms were sufficient to
justify an unbundling obligation, the Commission would have required
the unbundling of a large number of elements. In fact, the Commission’s rule had required that only seven elements be unbundled.56 Those
elements obviously satisfy the barely-there impairment standard that the
Court ascribes to the Commission, but almost certainly they also satisfy
55 525 US at 390.
56 See 47 CFR § 51.319 (1997).
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a much higher threshold—as the Commission itself concluded when it
revisited these issues on remand.57 Moreover, the Commission’s list
matches up quite well with the list Congress built into section 271, a
provision that more fully specifies the unbundling requirement as it applies to former Bell Operating Companies interested in offering inregion long distance service.58 That further suggests that the Commission in fact did apply some sort of materiality standard in its analysis,
even if that standard was not explicitly written out.
All that said, however, the Court’s real objection with respect to
both market availability and materiality is that the Commission had not
made sufficiently clear its assumptions, reservations, and interpretations.
The document in which the Commission had explained its rules was
muddled and at times seemingly inconsistent. That is understandable
given that Congress had ordered the Commission to prepare the document and issue the accompanying rules no later than six months after
the enactment of the 1996 Act.59 But the Court nevertheless thought
that the problems were serious enough so as to require that the Commission attempt once more to clarify and explain the scope of the unbundling requirement. Hence the Court vacated the rule in which the
Commission named the specific elements that were to be unbundled
and then remanded for further proceedings both in the Commission and
in the Eighth Circuit.
Iowa Utilities does approve some other, less sweeping regulations
that the Commission had put forward with regard to mandatory sharing. For instance, the Commission had announced in the so-called “all
elements” rule that an entrant can purchase access to unbundled network elements even if that entrant does not itself own any telecommunications facilities.60 Incumbents had argued for the opposite rule, namely
that entrants should have to bring at least some equipment to market in
order to qualify for mandatory sharing. That, of course, would have delayed entry—presumably exactly what the incumbents were seeking—
57 See 47 CFR § 51.319 (2002).
58 See 47 USC § 271(c)(2)(B) (2002). For discussion, see Telecommunications Law & Policy
at 755-67 (cited in note 6).
59 47 USC § 251(d)(1).
60 See First Report and Order at ¶¶ 328-40 (cited in note 10).
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but it would have had the possibly offsetting benefit of encouraging entrants to invest in their own facilities, what is called in the industry “facilities-based” competition. The Court upheld the Commission mainly
on grounds that the statute said nothing explicit on the subject.61
Similarly, the Court sided with the Commission in its determination that incumbents should not be allowed to separate previously joined
network elements before granting access to entrants.62 The idea, in the
Commission’s words, was to stop incumbents from “disconnecting previously connected elements, over the objection of the requesting carrier,
not for any productive reason, but just to impose wasteful reconnection
costs on new entrants.”63 Incumbents had plausibly objected to this rule
on grounds that it, especially when combined with the “all elements”
rule, made it too easy for entrants to use the unbundling provisions to
purchase complete telecommunications services. An entrant who wanted
to purchase a complete service could do so under other provisions of the
1996 Act, but at wholesale prices, not cost.64 The incumbents’ point was
that the unbundling provisions should be kept meaningfully distinct
from these resale provisions, in that way ensuring that each entry
mechanism offers a unique mix of price, risk, and obligation.65
Lastly, the Court also approved the Commission’s “pick-andchoose” rule, an interpretation of section 252(i) of the Act. Section
252(i) somewhat cryptically states that an incumbent must make any
network element that it provides to one party “available to any other
requesting telecommunications carrier upon the same terms and conditions as those provided in the agreement.”66 The Commission took this
to mean that entrants can scour agreements previously reached between
61 525 US at 392-93.
62 For the Commission’s rule, see 47 CFR § 51.315(b) (1997). For the Court’s discussion, see
525 US at 395-396.
63 525 US at 395, quoting Reply Brief (cited in note 51).
64 Section 251(c)(4) states that an incumbent must sell to rivals, at wholesale rates, any telecommunications service it provides at retail to subscribers. Section 251(b)(1) requires nonincumbents to also offer these services for resale, but that provision says nothing about the
relevant price. 47 USC §§ 251(c)(4), 251(b)(1).
65 In essence, the incumbents were trying to stop a form of regulatory arbitrage.
66 47 USC § 252(i).
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incumbents and other entrants, pull out a provision from a deal over
here and another over there—hence the pick-and-choose denomination—and cobble them together into a single agreement.67 But that interpretation, incumbents pointed out, undermines the “give-and-take of
negotiation,” since every concession made in one setting automatically
becomes available in all future settings.68 Incumbents therefore favored
an interpretation where an entrant would be allowed to use an existing
agreement but only if taken as a whole. As we said, the Court in the end
sided with the Commission, reasoning that the Commission’s approach,
while unusual, tracked the actual language of the statute.69
Let us pause a moment here and insure that we have not lost the
forest for the trees. In addition to some jurisdictional issues,70 Iowa
Utilities addressed a number of important questions about how mandatory sharing would work. The Court addressed these issues narrowly,
focusing as it must on its job of statutory construction. But it ultimately
approved and rejected an array of regulations that have significant implications for how sharing will work in the telecommunications market.
Think, for instance, about pick-and-choose. An incumbent’s natural
response to the Commission’s interpretation will be to push towards
uniformity in its agreements, thereby minimizing the opportunities for
cherry-picking across agreements. That does, to some extent, straitjacket the incumbents, and we should be concerned about that, but a
countervailing benefit is that it pushes the incumbents toward nondiscrimination in their dealings with entrants. Non-discrimination duties are frequently imposed on regulated firms as part of sharing regimes71 and they are normally quite difficult to enforce. The pick-andchoose rule goes at this from another angle, adopting something of a
self-enforcing, de-centralized approach to nondiscrimination. Give
some entrant a good deal on something and later entrants will grab it as
67 47 CFR § 51.809 (2002) (Commission regulation implementing the provision).
68 525 US at 395.
69 Id at 396.
70 See note 6.
71 See, for example, 16 USC § 824k(a) (2002) (nondiscrimination in wheeling electricity); 47
USC § 251(b) (nondiscrimination duties of local exchange carriers); 47 USC § 251(c) (additional duties for ILECs).
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well, almost like a statutory most-favored-nation clause. This decentralized approach might very well be a superior alternative to centralized
enforcement of non-discrimination obligations and ultimately an important factor in how the 1996 Act’s overall sharing regime will work in
practice.
B. Verizon
That takes us to this past Term and Verizon. At issue in Verizon was the
Commission’s approach to pricing shared access. Incumbent local exchange carriers challenged the Commission’s rules on two grounds: first,
that they were not a reasonable interpretation of the relevant provisions
of the Act; and, second, that under the rule of constitutional avoidance
the Court should interpret the 1996 Act to preclude the Commission’s
pricing methodology and in that way avoid the possible constitutional
question of whether the statute as implemented by the Commission results in a taking of property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. We will return to both of these arguments immediately
below; but to understand them, it is helpful to begin by getting a sense
of the issues at stake when it comes to setting the price for an unbundled
network element.
The first issue is whether access prices should be set at the level of
marginal cost. Basic economics teaches that marginal cost pricing leads
to efficient use. But marginal cost pricing does not compensate firms for
their non-marginal investments—in this case, investments in copper
wires, computerized telephone switches, and other parts of the local
telecommunications network. Denying incumbents any return on these
investments seems unfair, and it also would distinguish this market from
a well-functioning conventional market, since even conventional markets allow competing firms to earn returns on their non-marginal investments. Worse, there is a dynamic wrinkle, namely that if incumbents are treated unfairly in this instance, new entrants might be reluctant to enter the market for fear that future regulations will burn them,
too.72
72 Of course, there are ways to compensate incumbents for their non-marginal investments
while still setting access prices at the level of marginal cost. For example, the government could
set prices at marginal cost—thereby maximizing efficiency—but then pay incumbents a onetime cash transfer funded by general tax revenues. If that seems too vulnerable to government
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All this might in the end mean that the right approach is to sacrifice
efficiency and build non-marginal costs into access prices. But which
costs? For example, should incumbents be allowed to recover the costs of
an expensive computer system that was purchased even though a less
expensive alternative would have sufficed? How might such a purchase
be distinguished from a computer system that was wisely purchased, or a
computer system that was prudent when purchased but turned out to be
useless or excessive?73 Should we think differently about that question if
it turns out that regulators encouraged incumbents to choose one computer system over the other? What if regulators were more passively involved, for example not explicitly weighing in on the decision but approving it after it was already made by the incumbent? Does that bind
the government to later build the relevant expense into access prices on
some form of implicit contract theory?74
These concerns represent just the tip of the iceberg. How should we
account for the monies that incumbents have already earned on their
infrastructure investments, ensuring that regulation does not allow the
incumbents to recoup their expenses twice? How should non-marginal
error or abuse, an alternative approach would have the government set prices at marginal cost
and then encourage incumbents to sue for fair compensation under the Takings Clause. This
would introduce the courts as a check on the level of the transfer payment, and this is in fact
one way to understand the Verizon litigation. For discussion of these ideas in the context of the
patent system, see Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, Vanderbilt L Rev (forthcoming 2003); Douglas Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government Should Subsidize the Purchase
of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 Harv J L & Tech 123 (1997). Note that using the Takings
Clause in this manner might be particularly attractive if our main worry here is that, in the heat
of the moment, regulated parties will be mistreated. The reason is that the takings approach
separates in time the decision to regulate from the decision over fair compensation.
73 This is not just a hypothetical difficulty. For example, telecommunications firms have spent
billions of dollars in recent years laying over 100 million miles of high-capacity optical fiber, yet
it is estimated that only 2.7% of that installed fiber is currently being used. See Yochi J.
Dreazen, Wildly Optimistic Data Drove Telecoms to Build Fiber Glut, Wall Street Journal (September 26, 2002). Was this a case of imprudent investment run amok, or did these investments
make sense at the time but prove unwise in hindsight? For discussion of a similar problem in
the electric industry—namely storage facilities built to accompany planned nuclear power
plants where the relevant power plants were then never built—see State of North Carolina Utilities Commission v Thornburg, 325 NC 484 (1989) and State of North Carolina Utilities Commission v Thornburg, 325 NC 463 (1989).
74 For more detailed discussion of the so-called regulatory contract, see Gregory Sidak and
Daniel Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory Contract (Cambridge, 1997).
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costs be adjusted in light of various tax and accounting issues; for instance, if an incumbent has depreciated the value of a given infrastructure investment in a particular way in order to achieve some tax advantage, should that depreciation path be binding in this setting as well?
And, realistically, how well can we expect the government to estimate
any of these many figures, given that the best source for all this information is the regulated incumbent itself, but the regulated incumbent has
strong incentives to distort this information in ways that increase access
prices?
A second set of issues here involves the relationship between access
prices and the incentives firms face to either improve the existing network or build new infrastructure. Consider the incentives facing new
entrants first. If access prices are sufficiently low, entrants have little
reason to venture into the business of actually developing their own facilities. Why take on the risk of building it yourself when the existing
infrastructure is available at a bargain price? That is not so troubling if
we think that incumbents are better suited to build and innovate anyway—say, because they have more experience in the industry, or more
financial wherewithal—but it is more likely that, when we say we want
competition in the local loop, we mean that we want several firms working on new ideas about marketing, pricing, and, yes, the design of the
network itself. If that is true, low prices can undermine a key objective
of the Act.75
Of course, high prices can be just as bad. A sufficiently high price
might lead entrants to build their own infrastructure even in instances
where society would be better off had the entrants just shared existing
equipment. Entrants would be building in this instance not because the

75 Even if prices are low, entrants do still have some incentive to innovate. For instance, entrants have an incentive to innovate with respect to whatever infrastructure and services they
combine with the incumbent’s unbundled network elements; so, to be simple, if an entrant
leases copper lines from the incumbent but is using its own computer system to provide internet access over those lines, obviously the entrant has incentive to upgrade and improve its own
computer system. Similarly, entrants have some incentive to innovate with respect to leased
elements, too. Staying with our simple example, if our hypothetical entrant sees a way to improve the copper lines, he might contact the relevant incumbent and offer to cut a deal, suggesting the improvement to the incumbent and in exchange demanding some sort of financial
reward. Our point in the text is only that a significant incentive disappears if the regulated price
of leased access is too low.
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new infrastructure was cost-justified, but instead because the regulated
price was artificially high. In some of these instances, the incumbent
might voluntarily offer the entrant a lower price, thereby avoiding inefficient build-around. But that seems unlikely, at least if the incumbent’s
main goal is to keep the costs of entry high and thereby protect its market dominance. Moreover, even if the incumbent does offer a lower
price, the Act will have played no role in that outcome; a world with a
mandatory sharing regime and a sufficiently high access price is roughly
equivalent to a world with no mandatory sharing regime at all.
Now consider the incentives facing incumbents. If our goal is to
maximize incumbents’ investment incentives, it is not at all clear how
best to set the access price. On the one hand, if incumbents know that
their facilities will be available to rivals at low rates, they might be reluctant to invest in new infrastructure. What would be the point, since any
advantage would immediately be made available to rivals anyway?
Worse, the costs of any errors would be borne entirely by the incumbent, since a dud technology would not attract any buyers. On this story,
low access prices seem likely to discourage investment in unbundled network elements, driving incumbents to invest instead in their brand
names and other resources not subject to mandatory sharing.
On the other hand, low access prices can stimulate investment.
Consider, for example, an investment that would slightly decrease the
marginal costs of providing some network element. If access prices are
high, demand is likely low, and the allure of investing in this new technology is thus also relatively low. Saving a few pennies on each of a few
sales simply does not warrant a significant infrastructure expense. If access prices are low, however, demand for the network element will skyrocket, and now the analysis might shift, since saving a few pennies on
each of a large number of sales might very well justify a significant infrastructure investment.76 Thus we can say nothing definitive about the
access price that maximizes an incumbent’s incentive to innovate.

76 This is a consistent with the literature that questions whether monopolists or competitors
have a greater incentive to engage in innovation. The point there, and here, is that one important factor is the researching firm’s expectations as to the number of units it will ultimately sell.
For links into that literature, see Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization 390-94
(MIT, 1988).
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The Commission could not escape so easily; it had to promulgate
some rule, and whatever rule it chose was going to have implications for
all of the various incentives and debates outlined above. Congress had
given the Commission little help in this effort. Remember, the relevant
provision of the 1996 Act states only that firms should be allowed to
purchase access to unbundled network elements at “just and reasonable
rates” that are “non-discriminatory” and “may include a reasonable
profit.”77 Good luck mapping those vague constraints to the practical
issues at stake in the decision. Congress had offered one further bit of
guidance, however, namely a clause in section 252 that states that rates
should be “based on . . . cost” but “determined without reference to a
rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding.”78 That is a lot of lingo,
but the clause seems to refer to and reject the conventional mechanisms
that had previously been used to set prices in telecommunications and
other regulated industries. Congress did not tell the Commission what
alternative to adopt; but Congress seems to be saying that the old approaches—each fraught with difficulties well known in the network industries literature79—were not to be applied.
Writing on this virtually blank slate, the Commission adopted the
following approach. First, the Commission chose to interpret “cost” to
mean “forward-looking economic cost” instead of cost defined by the
actual historic investments made in the particular element at issue.80
The FCC defined the forward-looking cost of a network element to be
the sum of “the total element long-run incremental cost of the element”
(TELRIC) plus “a reasonable allocation of forward-looking common
costs” where common costs are “costs incurred in providing a group of
elements that cannot be attributed directly to individual elements.”81
Most controversially, the Commission announced that TELRIC would
“be measured based on the use of the most efficient telecommunications

77 47 USC § 252(d).
78 Id.
79 For an introduction to the standard approaches and their pitfalls, see Telecommunications
Law and Policy at 425-29 (cited in note 6).
80 See 47 CFR § 51.505 (2002).
81 47 CFR § 51.505(a) (2002).
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technology currently available and the lowest cost network configuration, given the existing location” of the incumbent’s wire centers.82
Again, a great deal of lingo; but the key insights here are two. First,
when fully unpacked, the Commission’s rule adopts a middling position
with respect to most of the competing factors discussed above. Forwardlooking cost as defined by the Commission focuses on marginal cost but
also accounts for some fixed costs, some degree of profit, some degree of
depreciation over time, and so on. It is in truth a complicated balance that,
for better or worse, can be applied flexibly to various specific network elements. Second, and a bit more extreme, the Commission’s approach does
take a firm stance on the issue of incumbent-specific costs: while access
prices will account for a variety of factors, those factors will largely be calculated in the abstract instead of being specifically mapped to the actual
history of the network element at issue. This avoids the problem of relying
too heavily on numbers that only the incumbent knows; and it also
matches up with how value is calculated in competitive markets, since the
value of any good is determined by its benefits and costs as compared to
current alternatives, not the history of how much its seller spent in creating it. The downsides to this approach from the incumbents’ perspective
are that it might mean that some investments will never be fully recouped,
and it almost surely means that access prices will steadily drop over time as
new alternatives erode the value of existing infrastructure.
The legal analysis in Verizon did not end up delving significantly into
any of the above details. The Court surveyed these issues, but on the question of whether the Commission’s interpretation was reasonable, the
Court quickly recognized that there was considerable discretion built into
the statute. For instance, the incumbents had argued that the Commission’s pricing methodology was not “based on . . . cost” because, among
other things, the Commission had defined cost to mean the expense
that would be incurred were an equivalent network built today instead of
adopting the arguably more conventional definition that cost means actual monies spent. The Court responded that the word cost “is a virtually meaningless term” that gives “rate setting commissions broad methodological leeway” and says “little about the method employed to deter-

82 47 CFR § 51.505(b)(1) (2002).
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mine a particular rate.”83 In short, given the vague language used in the
Act, virtually anything the Commission had put forward in terms of its
pricing methodology would have fallen within the scope of Chevron deference. When it came to access pricing, Congress seems to have had only
one specific detail in mind—a distrust of the traditional approaches—and,
whatever one wants to say about the Commission’s rule, it certainly is not
a traditional approach.
The possible issue with respect to the Takings Clause was also easily—albeit somewhat unsatisfactorily—resolved. Again, the incumbents
had argued that the Court should interpret the 1996 Act to preclude the
Commission’s pricing methodology in order to avoid the possible constitutional question of whether the statute as implemented by the Commission results in a taking of property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The Court refused to do so on grounds that the takings
claim as alleged by the incumbents did not itself raise a “serious question,”
or at least that it did not raise a sufficiently serious question to warrant
application of the rule of constitutional avoidance. The primary reason was
that the incumbents were endeavoring to challenge a pricing methodology
as opposed to specific rates. This ran against the Court’s “general rule” that
it does not consider “a taking challenge on ratesetting methodology without being presented with specific rate orders alleged to be confiscatory.”84
The logic is that it is difficult to anticipate how a methodology will translate into numbers. The pricing methodology at issue in Verizon, for instance, was so flexible that it was still almost impossible for the Court to
guess whether the resulting prices would be high or low, let alone unconstitutionally low in violation of the Takings Clause. The Court was thus
reluctant to deem the constitutional issue sufficiently serious.85
All that strikes us as somewhat reasonable and we do not want to be
unfairly critical; however, this decision to in effect defer the incumbents’
possible takings claim had significant implications, and we are not con-

83 122 S Ct at 1667 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
84 Id at 1679.
85 The Court did indicate that it might have been willing to further consider the takings claim
if there were evidence that the regulatory change had been “arbitrary, opportunistic, or undertaken with a confiscatory purpose.” Id at 1681. There was no such evidence presented, however.
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vinced that the Court weighed them with care. First, by punting on the
takings claim, the Court in essence set in motion fifty new lawsuits that
will soon be filed in the federal courts, each alleging that the pricing provisions as tailored and implemented in a specific state violate the Takings Clause given the regulatory history of that state’s incumbents.
Maybe that flood of litigation was unavoidable, but one wonders nevertheless whether the Court could have said something more to help shape
expectations and thus minimize the disruption those cases will ultimately cause.
Second and more broadly, while it might sound prudent to delay
any serious takings analysis until actual numbers are in hand, the fact is
that the benefits of delay are small and the costs are substantial. Focus
on the benefits first. Delay does indeed mean that, when the claim is
litigated in the future, there will be real numbers to work with instead of
just a verbal description of the Commission’s pricing methodology. But
numbers really do not matter much when it comes to answering the basic questions about whether there can be a taking in a situation like this
and, more specifically, how courts will ultimately calculate the extent of
any such taking. These are difficult questions to be sure, but the answers
are not at all tied to specific numbers. The Court was therefore in as
good a position to answer them in Verizon as it will be in some hypothetical case down the road.
The benefits of waiting, then, seem small; but consider the costs.
The Takings Clause is primed to play a central and beneficial role in the
implementation of the unbundled network elements regime. For it to do
so, however, both the Commission and the incumbents need to have
confidence that ultimately a takings remedy will be available. Think of it
this way: if the takings claim looks implausible, the Commission has to
set prices with an eye toward balancing several competing factors. Specifically, the price has to promote efficient use of network elements in
the short run; promote efficient investment in research and development
by the incumbents in the long-run; similarly promote efficient investment in research and development by new entrants in the long-run; and
on top of that address the distributional implications that are the core of
the takings claim. This is hard to accomplish, both because the analysis
becomes complicated with all these factors in play and because these
factors often push in opposite directions. For instance, to maximize
short-run efficiency, the Commission should set prices at the level of

Lichtman & Picker

Entry Policy in Local Telecommunications

28

marginal cost, but to address the distributional issue prices will certainly
have to be far above marginal cost.
If the Commission and the incumbents have confidence that a takings claim will ultimately be successful, by contrast, the Commission can
ignore the distributional issue when setting access prices and focus exclusively on the various incentive effects. It can do this knowing all the
while that any distributional issue will be fairly addressed separately.
This is important because it eliminates the tension identified above. If
the distributional and efficiency issues can be handled separately, then
when the Commission sets its prices it does not have to compromise on
efficiency in order to account for distributional concerns. Instead, it can
set prices that sensibly balance all the various incentives and then,
through takings litigation, help to ensure that incumbents are fairly
compensated for their losses. Incumbents, meanwhile, would in these
circumstances be precluded from arguing against the Commission’s
prices on purely distributional grounds. That would not only narrow the
grounds for disagreement but perhaps also dampen incumbents’ incentives to delay implementation of the Act.
Again, all this is possible only if the Commission and the incumbents can have confidence that the distributional issue will ultimately be
addressed. The Verizon Court did nothing in support of that aim. This
is not suprising given existing Takings Clause jurisprudence. The leading cases do express a general reluctance to litigate takings claims in the
abstract, and the Court certainly was understandably reluctant to rewrite
takings law as part of the Verizon litigation. That said, however, the net
result here is that the Court will have slightly better information to work
with if and when it finally does evaluate the takings claim, but the bulk
of the value in allowing that claim will have already been sacrificed.
II. Natural Monopoly and Entry
From its infancy, federal telecommunications law has proceeded on the
assumption that local telephone service is a natural monopoly. That is, it
has been assumed that costs in this market are such that it is less expensive for demand to be met by one firm than it is for demand to be met
by any number of competing firms. In this section, we want to explore
in some detail what it means to say that something is a natural monop-
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oly and, further, what insight that might offer in terms of understanding
the issues at stake in Iowa Utilities and Verizon and, more broadly, the
local competition provisions of the 1996 Act itself.
A. Natural Monopoly in the Local Telephone Market
Let us start by making the case that local telephone service is indeed
best understood as a natural monopoly. Again, the generic definition is
that natural monopoly occurs where it is less expensive for demand to be
met by one firm than it would be for that same demand to be met by
some number of competing firms. One reason that this might be true in
local telephony is that there are significant fixed costs associated with
telephone service. For example, to provide service, a firm must lay wires
throughout the relevant area and install appropriate computer equipment to route telephone signals along the network. It would greatly increase the total cost of telephone service to have two firms incur those
same expenses in the same geographic area, and any such added costs are
pure waste if a single network could have satisfied demand. Thus, on
this argument, telephone service looks like a natural monopoly.
There are other reasons as well to think that local telephone service
exhibits the properties of a natural monopoly.86 For instance, an individual’s demand for telephone service varies significantly from moment
to moment and day to day; yet, in order to provide adequate service, the
telephone company has to be ready to serve a given user whenever that
user happens to pick up the telephone. If a different firm were to serve
each user, there would be significant waste since almost all of each
phone system’s capacity would sit idle for most of the day. By having a
single firm serve a large number of users, by contrast, the costs of providing phone service can be lowered dramatically. Several users can share
a given amount of capacity, putting the equipment to better use since
the variance in each consumer’s demand would to some degree cancel
out, leaving less of the phone system’s capacity to sit idle at a given time.
Sometimes—say, Mother’s Day—everyone will want to use the phone at
the same moment, and, at that time, some customers will be denied service; but, for most of the year, users can share capacity without any degradation in service, and thus it is cheaper to have a single firm serve
86 Parts of this discussion are adopted, with permission, from Telecommunications Law and
Policy at 614-18 (cited in note 6).

Lichtman & Picker

Entry Policy in Local Telecommunications

30

many customers than it is to have multiple firms serve that same number
of customers.
Similarly, telephone systems are said to exhibit “network effects,”
which for our purposes means that the benefits of telephone ownership
increase as the number of subscribers increases. A single telephone in
isolation is of little value to its owner since there is no one to call. But
the usefulness of that telephone grows exponentially as more and more
people join the same telephone network. If there were competing telephone networks, to achieve this same level of value society would have
to spend considerably greater resources. Perhaps consumers would have
to purchase and maintain multiple telephones, using their WorldCom
telephone to talk to their friends on the WorldCom network and their
AT&T telephone to talk to their friends on the AT&T network.87 Or
perhaps the government would have to force the networks to interconnect—an expensive proposition given that it would likely require that
the government monitor compliance, oversee negotiations, and otherwise help to ensure that the various reluctant allies work together. In
short, network effects increase the value of having just a single telephone
network, which is the same thing as saying that having multiple telephone networks increases the costs of achieving a given quality of service. That, like the two preceding arguments, makes it likely that local
telephone service is a natural monopoly.
So what? As we will explain below, characterizing local telephone
service as a natural monopoly tells us very little. It does not tell us
whether we should expect to see competition. It does not tell us
whether, if we see competition, we should be pleased or discouraged. It
does not tell us that there should be regulation, nor does it tell us that
regulation is unnecessary. Instead, characterizing local telephone service
as a natural monopoly tells us only that there is an important conversation to be had—a conversation about the possibility of competition in

87 A similar set of issues is currently playing out with respect to instant messaging (IM).
America Online has had the leading IM service. Entrants, including Yahoo and Microsoft,
have sought to interconnect their IM programs with AOL’s, in that way gaining quick access
to a large pool of IM users. AOL has responded with technology walls that make it more difficult for new entrants to interconnect with the AOL IM network. Users, in turn, have responded by downloading multiple IM programs. See Jim Hu and Sandeep Junnarkar, AOL
Blocks Microsoft Net Messaging, CNET News.com (July 23, 1999).
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the first place, and the costs and benefits of competition should we believe it possible. It is to that conversation that we now turn.
B. Implications of Natural Monopoly
Natural monopoly suggests a contrast to unnatural monopoly or artificial
monopoly. This is in fact how Judge Learned Hand saw the issue in
1945 when—because the Supreme Court could not muster a quorum88—the Second Circuit was called upon to offer the final word as to
whether Alcoa had monopolized the aluminum market in violation of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act:
It does not follow because Alcoa had . . . a monopoly, that
it “monopolized” the ingot market: it may not have
achieved monopoly; monopoly may have been thrust upon
it. If it had been a combination of existing smelters which
united the whole industry and controlled the production of
all aluminum ingot, it would certainly have “monopolized”
the market. In several decisions the Supreme Court has decreed the dissolution of such combinations, although they
had engaged in no unlawful trade practices. . . . [P]ersons
may unwittingly find themselves in possession of a monopoly, automatically so to say: that is, without having intended either to put an end to existing competition, or to
prevent competition from arising when none had existed;
they may become monopolists by force of accident. . . . A
market may, for example, be so limited that it is impossible
to produce at all and meet the cost of production except by
a plant large enough to supply the whole demand. Or there
may be changes in taste or in cost which drive out all but
one purveyor. A single producer may be the survivor out of
a group of active competitors, merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry. In such cases a strong argument can be made that, although the result may expose
the public to the evils of monopoly, the [Sherman] Act
88 See Allen-Myland, Inc. v IBM, 33 F3d 194, 203 n10 (3d Cir 1996) (“In Alcoa, however, a
sufficient number of justices were recused that a quorum could not be obtained; accordingly,
the Supreme Court . . . remanded the case to the three most senior judges of the Second Circuit”).
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does not mean to condemn the resultant of those very
forces which it is its prime object to foster: finis opus coronat. The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.89
Hand’s point is that artificial monopoly and natural monopoly require different sorts of legal responses. Mergers between rivals and collusion among competitors both create artificial forms of monopoly and,
in Hand’s view, both are rightly regulated under federal antitrust law.
But “natural” monopoly—what Hand saw as monopoly thrust upon a
firm either as the inevitable result of vigorous competition or because of
the cost structure of the relevant market—is different. It might lead to
the same evils in terms of high prices and restricted quantities, but it
should be regulated, if at all, through special legislation targeted at the
particular industry, not through the generic provisions of antitrust.
So far so good, but matters become significantly less clear when the
question turns to what exactly that special legislation should say. Consider a core case of natural monopoly, for example a situation where a
firm has to first undertake a substantial fixed cost before any units of the
relevant product can be produced, but the firm can then produce as
many units as it wants at a stable per-unit cost. Computer software, for
example, matches this pattern. A company spends a substantial amount
of money to write, test and debug its software, but once the product is in
hand, it can produce as many CDs as it wants at a set per-unit cost.
Note why this cost structure can be thought of as a natural monopoly cost structure. The least expensive way to produce any amount of the
good in question is to have one firm supply all comers. This is the con89 United States v Aluminum Co of America, 148 F2d 416, 430 (1945). Hand wrote this against
an almost non-existent Supreme Court backdrop. The Court had used the phrase “natural
monopoly” only twice, first in 1910 in a dispute over a waterworks plant, City of Omaha v
Omaha Water Co, 218 US 180 (1910), and then again in 1932 in a Fourteenth Amendment
challenge to an Oklahoma statute restricting entry into the ice business, New State Ice Co v
Liebmann, 285 US 262 (1932). Neither case had offered any real sense of how to think about
natural monopoly or its implications. Perhaps even more interesting, the Court had not used
the phrase in any of its three key pre-Alcoa decisions on the constitutional limits on public
utility rate regulation—Smyth, Southwestern Bell and Hope Natural Gas—three cases that would
today almost surely be analyzed as cases primarily about natural monopoly. See Federal Power
Commission v Hope Natural Gas Co, 320 US 591 (1944); Missouri ex rel Southwestern Bell Telephone Co v Public Service Commission of Missouri, 262 US 276 (1923); Smyth v Ames, 169 US
466 (1898).
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ventional—perhaps even natural!—definition of natural monopoly.90 If
two firms were to produce, the fixed costs would be incurred twice; and
yet there would be no benefit, since per-unit cost is the same regardless
of how production is split between the two firms. That is, if the industry
produces ten units, the marginal cost of producing each unit will be the
same regardless of whether all ten are produced by one firm, five are
produced by one firm and five by the other, or any other pattern. The
only cost that changes is the amount of money invested up front. Those
fixed costs rise directly with the number of firms in the industry—two
times the fixed costs with two firms, fifty times with fifty firms—and,
focusing just on the costs of production, we are therefore better off having only one firm produce.91
But does this cost structure mean that we will see only one firm in
the market? In short, does a natural monopoly naturally lead to monopoly? And, if so, what implications flow from that conclusion? Start with
the second question first. If we would naturally see only one firm producing in a natural monopoly market, we would then need to be concerned about whether that firm can exercise monopoly power. The social harm of monopoly is well-known: monopolists tend to raise prices
and restrict output, the net effect being both a transfer of wealth from
consumers to the monopolist and pure deadweight loss in the form of
efficient transactions that never take place due to the monopolist’s supra-competitive price. This is an argument for regulating the monopolist’s price and, if the monopolist can respond to price regulation by
skimping on quality, then regulating his quality, too.
We should be careful though. Even if natural monopoly means that
there will be only one firm producing, that does not at all imply that the
firm will be capable of exercising market power. This is part of what had
worried Hand in Alcoa and the same question has been an issue in the
Microsoft antitrust litigation.92 But the theory is clear: the threat of po90 See, for example, Dennis Carlton and Jeffrey Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization 101
(Addison-Wesley, 3d ed 2000).
91 Notice that this is an argument about the costs of production; it says nothing about the price
that will ultimately prevail. For discussion of other cost structures that lead to natural monopoly, see Telecommunications Law and Policy at 374-80 (cited in note 6).
92 See Robert E. Hall, Optimal Contracts to Defend Upstream Monopoly 23 (January 25, 2000)
(working paper on file with authors).
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tential entry can exert substantial pressure on prices, even in a market
where everyone knows that at the end of the day only one firm will remain standing. The idea is that the producing firm will in certain instances have to cabin its price in order to discourage would-be rivals
from entering the market, undercutting the prevailing price, and ultimately taking over as the new monopolist. The credibility of this threat
depends on a host of issues; for instance, if the existing firm can change
its price quickly, the threat of entry might not be substantial, since the
moment a rival enters the existing firm will be able to match the rival’s
price and in that way thwart the rival’s strategy. Conversely, if the existing firm cannot change its price quickly, or indeed if it can change price
quickly but is slow at detecting entry by a rival, then the threat of future
entry is significant and the existing firm will face strong pressure to keep
prices low.93
That answers the second of our questions, but what of the first? All
of the analysis so far has assumed that, at equilibrium, natural monopoly
means that there will be only one firm producing in the market. But that
is not necessarily right, since even in the face of natural monopoly costs
there is still often a real incentive for firms to enter the market. Be clear
on what that means: even if we have a cost technology such that overall
production costs could be minimized by having a single firm produce,
we might see more than one firm producing. When might that be true?
One key issue is what the potential entrant anticipates the incumbent
producer will do in response to entry. For example, if the entrant believes that the incumbent will cut prices to marginal cost, the entrant
would foresee little chance of recovering its fixed costs—hardly an attractive business plan to the venture capitalists or bond-holders forking
over the money to pay the fixed costs. In contrast, if the entrant believes
that it and the incumbent will be able to come to terms, either through
explicit collusion or implicit interactions in the marketplace, the entrant
may anticipate sufficient profits so as to justify entry despite the natural
monopoly cost structure.
Economists, it turns out, have said a lot about all of this. If we expect the incumbent and the entrant to compete in prices—so-called

93 See William J. Baumol et al, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure 2 (Harcourt, 1988).
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Bertand competition94—then the resulting Nash equilibrium would
result in marginal cost pricing and hence the entrant has no incentive to
enter in the first place. In that case, natural monopoly does naturally
lead to monopoly. If we expect the incumbent and entrant to compete in
quantities, however—Cournot competition95—we may have entry by
some number of firms and an equilibrium with some competition. Similarly, if we expect the incumbent and the entrant to bifurcate the market, with each firm specializing in some subset of customer needs or
some specific geographic area, we might again see an equilibrium with
multiple firms, this time with each firm acting as a monopolist to its
own smaller sub-market.
Where does all this leave us? If we have natural monopoly costs and
just one firm producing but we do not have potential entrants exerting
pressure on prices, natural monopoly means a market where prices are
inefficiently high. That is a problem and should make clear why rate
regulation has been the historical legislative response to natural monopoly situations. If, by contrast, we have natural monopoly costs, one firm
producing, and a real threat of potential entry, then we likely will have
quasi-competitive pricing and, interestingly, no need for regulation.
Lastly, if we have natural monopoly costs but nevertheless the possibility
of multiple firms in the market, we have a choice to make. We can restrict competition—that is, turn away would-be competitors—and in
that way force the market to revert to one of the two situations just considered. That was the traditional approach to the local telephone market
adopted by federal telecommunications law in its infancy and maintained up until the 1996 Act.96 Or we can embrace the possibility of
competition but use regulation simultaneously to mitigate the economic
waste it causes and to insure that prices stay well below the monopolistic
level. This, as we will discuss further, is arguably the approach adopted
under the 1996 Act.
Obviously this choice has implications not only for social welfare
but also for would-be market participants. For instance, the first firm to
94 Carlton and Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization at 157-61 (cited in note 90).
95 Id at 166-68.
96 This parallels the long-standing approach of regulating entry by giving public utilities commissions the power to enforce certificate of convenience and necessity statutes.
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enter a natural monopoly market might be reluctant to invest heavily
without promises from the state that later competitors will be turned
away. It is one thing to invest in a natural monopoly market where your
firm will be the sole regulated entrant; quite another to invest in a natural monopoly market that might feature a revolving cast of would-be
competitors. Local governments used to lure cable television providers
by making just these sorts of promises.97 Applicants would compete ex
ante to be the chosen firm, but once a winner was chosen, that winner
would be awarded an exclusive franchise for the term of the deal. Local
officials would regulate cable prices and thus ensure that the chosen firm
was not behaving as a monopolist, but in exchange the government
would protect that firm from competition. Federal law changed to prohibit the practice in 1992, the fear being that the ability to grant exclusive licenses invested too much power in local government.98
C. Implications for the 1996 Act, Iowa Utilities and Verizon
The preceding analysis tells us what to expect if local telephone service
turns out to exhibit the properties of a natural monopoly. Let us now
connect these issues first to the 1996 Act and then to both Iowa Utilities
and Verizon. We said in the Introduction that the purpose of the Act’s
unbundling provisions is to promote competition. But how does that
claim link to the discussion here about natural monopolies? There are
several possible answers.
One possibility is that the Act rejects the longstanding view that the
market for local telephone service exhibits the properties of a natural
monopoly. On this interpretation, either regulators have been wrong all
these years about how the economics of this industry play out, or they
have been right but the dynamics of the market are different now thanks
to new technologies like wireless telephony and the possibility of carrying voice traffic over the cable television infrastructure. Note that the
purpose of the 1996 Act on this story is to guide the transition from a
97 For discussion, see Telecommunications Law and Policy at 429-31 (cited in note 6).
98 This change was made by the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act,
which prohibited local government both from granting exclusive franchises and from unreasonably refusing to award additional franchises. See Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992, Pub L No 102-385, 106 Stat 1460 (1992) at § 7(a)(1), codified
at 47 USC § 541 (2002).
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regulated natural monopoly to an unregulated, competitive market.
Sharing provisions encourage entry during this transition period and
possibly also make up for any advantages enjoyed by the incumbents by
virtue of their long involvement in the local market. But on this view the
sharing provisions should ultimately sunset once the transition period is
complete.
A more likely interpretation of the 1996 Act is that it does not reject the notion that local telephone service is a natural monopoly, but
instead simply reflects a new consensus that the costs of competition are
not so high as once feared and thus a mix of competition and regulation
might in the end be more attractive than an approach that relies on
regulation alone. Phrased another way, it might be the case that the experience of regulating monopolist telephone carriers over the years has
convinced Congress that regulation in that form is too costly, insufficiently effective, or both, and thus the 1996 Act experiments with a
more competitive approach. Such an approach might mean increased
economic waste, but the upside is that competition can supplement
regulation and perhaps create better incentives when it comes to innovation, quality, and price. Note that, this time, there is no reason to believe
that the 1996 Act will ever sunset; competition in this story is a supplement to, but not a replacement for, government regulation.
It is tempting to offer two other possible interpretations of the 1996
Act, but neither is correct. The first would suggest that the Act’s real
purpose is to help policymakers answer the question of whether and to
what extent local telephone service is a natural monopoly. On this view,
if entrants invoke the mandatory sharing provisions, then it can be assumed that the market has natural monopoly properties, whereas if they
build their own infrastructure, the opposite implication can be drawn.
That would be great, but it turns out that neither of those inferences
hold. Entrants will use the shared access provisions if the regulated price
of access is lower than the price of self provision, a decision that has
nothing to do with natural monopoly and everything to do with regulation. Similarly, entrants will build their own facilities if the regulated
price is higher than the price of self provision, again irrespective of any
natural monopoly issues. This is one of the reasons why the pricing rules
at issue in Verizon are so important; the government is regulating prices
because of a natural monopoly problem, but it is those prices—not the
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underlying economics of the market—that will determine both patterns
of entry and the incentive to develop new infrastructure.
The second tempting but incorrect interpretation casts the 1996 Act
as an exercise in deregulation. As is surely clear by now, that is not at all
right, since the Act introduces a great deal of new regulation, and much
of it will powerfully influence behavior in the local telephone market.
That said, the 1996 Act does promise to diminish the importance of
regulation, since if competition takes hold, competitive forces will do
some of the work formerly accomplished by government fiat. The 1996
Act, then, is probably best understood as regulation designed to harness
competition. Regulation will still in some instances be outcomedeterminative, but in most cases outcomes will be determined by some
combination of regulation and competitive pressures.
Turn now to Iowa Utilities. We pointed out above that there is no
natural connection between a natural monopoly cost structure on the
one hand and the possibility of competitive supply on the other. As applied to local telephone service, this means that network elements—even
network elements that exhibit the properties of a natural monopoly—
can in certain cases be competitively supplied even in the absence of
regulation. The upside is that competitive supply might yield good incentives for quality, pricing, and innovation; the downside is that competitive supply in the face of natural monopoly risks wasteful duplication
of resources. The 1996 Act does not specifically speak to this tradeoff,
and thus it does not give the Commission direct guidance in how to
react to this possibility of competition. Based solely on the provisions
enacted, it is possible that Congress meant to unbundle only those elements where competition was unlikely. But it is also possible that Congress meant to unbundle any element that exhibits natural monopoly
properties.
This was part of what the Commission had to struggle with when
interpreting the necessary and impair standards of section 251(d)(2).
And, while the Commission did not issue a clear final statement on this
particular question, the regulations at issue in Iowa Utilities certainly
were broad enough to include in the unbundling regime elements where
competition is possible even without mandatory unbundling. The Court
did not reject this conclusion per se; as we have pointed out, the Court
merely pushed for further explanation as to how the Commission had
come to this conclusion and, more specifically, how the possibility of
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market provision affects the scope of the unbundling requirement in the
Commission’s view.
Verizon addressed issues a little further removed from our basic intuitions about natural monopolies. The core issue there was the price at
which the government would require incumbents to sell access to their
unbundled network elements; and, while an understanding of natural
monopoly helps us to think about whether sharing itself makes sense,
that understanding tells us very little about the optimal price at which
any sharing should take place. That said, our discussion of natural monopoly does elucidate one aspect of Verizon, namely the incumbents’
takings claim. As we explained above, while natural monopoly can lead
to any number of regulatory responses, firms in a regulated market care
a great deal about which regulatory response is chosen. Indeed, firms
rely on and react to the government’s decision with respect to regulatory
form, adjusting their pricing and investment patterns accordingly. This
is the core insight behind the incumbents’ takings claim. Their objection
is that the government changed the rules of the market midstream, leaving incumbents holding the bag with respect to their long-term investments. The strength of that argument depends on a number of factors—
including whether the incumbents should have expected the possibility
of regulatory reform, and whether the incumbents have already earned
sufficient returns on their investments anyway—but the core insight is
that firms working in regulated natural monopoly markets do make investment decisions that are in part contingent on which of the several
plausible regulatory responses the incumbent expects.
III. Shared Access Under the 1996 Act
We are now ready to consider in more detail how regulation of the form
established by the 1996 Act differs from regulation as it had previously
existed in the local telephone market. We will focus on three principal
changes. First, under the old approach, local telephone service was regulated under the assumption that there should be only one monopolist
seller serving each community. The 1996 Act, by contrast, allows for
multiple competing sellers. Second, under the old approach, the entire
local loop was lumped together and regulated as an undifferentiated
whole. The new approach attempts to quarantine the effects of regula-
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tion by focusing more narrowly on particular network elements. Third
and finally, the old approach relied heavily on government regulation of
output prices, by which we mean regulation of the prices for goods and
services sold directly to consumers. The new approach continues to rely
on output price regulation but adds in addition regulation of input
prices, namely the prices incumbent local telephone companies charge
new entrants for access to unbundled network elements.
A. One Infrastructure, Several Owners
We have thus far identified as a natural monopoly any market where it
is less expensive for demand to be met by one firm than it is for demand
to be met by some number of competing firms. That is the standard
definition of natural monopoly, but it is not quite right. A more precise
variant would state that a natural monopoly exists whenever it is less
expensive for demand to be met using a single infrastructure than it is for
demand to be met using multiple, uncoordinated infrastructures. To see
what we mean, and why this point is so important to understanding the
1996 Act, consider two examples.
Start with cable television. It is easy to see that cable television likely
exhibits the properties of a natural monopoly. The main cost incurred in
providing cable television comes in laying the cable grid. Once that cost
has been incurred and there are wires running along all the major
streets, the cost of supplying cable to an additional home is relatively
small. A single cable grid can typically serve all customers who are willing to pay the marginal cost of cable service, and thus cable television is
likely a natural monopoly: costs are minimized by having only one cable
grid in each geographic area.
Natural monopoly thus implies that there should be only one cable
infrastructure. It tells us nothing, however, about how many firms
should own that single infrastructure. Suppose, for example, that two
firms were ordered to share ownership of a given community’s cable
grid, with one firm programming fifty channels and a competing firm
programming a different fifty channels. That sort of competition would
not be wasteful since there would be no duplication of the natural monopoly infrastructure. Moreover, it would offer some benefits, for example ensuring some diversity in terms of content and viewpoint. It would
thus be fully consistent to say that cable television exhibits the properties
of a natural monopoly and that cable regulation should ensure that each
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community has one cable grid but several firms using that grid to offer
cable television.
Consider now a second example, this one drawn from the 1912 Supreme Court decision in Terminal Railroad.99 At issue was an organization called the Terminal Railroad Association. Jay Gould—one of the
great figures in late nineteenth century railroading and telegraphy—had
combined into the Terminal Railroad Association the three main routes
by which railroads crossed the Mississippi River at St. Louis. These
were the ferry system run by Wiggins Ferry Company, a bridge called
Eads Railroad Bridge, and another bridge called the Merchants Bridge.
The United States challenged the three-way combination under the
Sherman Act, apparently afraid that competition in the railroad industry
would suffer in a world where a single entity controlled every plausible
means for crossing the Mississippi at St. Louis.
The government’s case was not particularly strong, as there was no
obvious discrimination by the railroad association in favor of insiders
and against outsiders. That is, Gould’s railroads used the terminal facilities on the same terms that non-affiliated railroads used the facilities. Of
course, given our concern about monopoly pricing, that could just mean
that all of the railroads were being gouged by the terminal association.
But the association was operated on a non-profit basis, just covering
costs and never paying dividends, and so it seems unlikely that monopoly prices were being charged.100 The terminal association had also expanded over time—moving from six members to fourteen—turning outsiders into insiders and thus further undermining any claim that Gould
was using his position to favor his own railroads over competing ones.
The Court saw much of this, recognizing that there was no real
problem with respect to equal access—at least, not yet—and also that
operating the three facilities together had some likely efficiency benefits.
But the Court still found that Gould had violated the Sherman Act.
The problem was not unequal access. It was unequal ownership. This is
99 United States v Terminal Railroad Ass’n of St Louis, 224 US 383 (1912).
100 This is somewhat tricky, as the Court recognized. Understanding who was making money
on nineteenth century railroads requires close tracking of the cash. You might lose money on
the railroad proper and make it up by owning the construction company doing the building. In
Terminal Railroad itself, it is possible that Gould and his compatriots were making money from
the bonds of the association rather than the stock. See id at 401.
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apparent from the Court’s ultimate remedy. The Court did not require
that the three means for crossing the river be operated separately. Instead, the Court simply required that Gould offer all existing and future
railroads the opportunity to join his Terminal Railroad Association on
“just and reasonable terms.”101 This would make the terminal association “the agent of all” and would legitimate Gould’s unification of the
facilities.102
We can quibble with this result. For instance, it is far from obvious
that the Court’s solution actually accomplished anything. Prior to its
ruling, fourteen insiders made decisions for the group of twenty-four
users, and ten outsiders had no say. After the ruling, if internal decisions
are made by majority vote, the same fourteen can continue to set policy.
It is true that if there were direct benefits flowing to the owners as
such—returns on equity—those presumably would have to be shared
with the now larger group, but there is nothing in the case to suggest
that special returns were flowing to the equity holders. But the big picture here is that the concern in this case was not the existence of a single
infrastructure for crossing the Mississippi, but was instead the fact that
the single infrastructure was controlled by a single entity, namely
Gould’s Terminal Railroad Association.
How does all this tie into the 1996 Act? Prior to the 1996 Act, local
telephone regulation had proceeded under the implicit assumption that,
if there was going to be only one local telecommunications network, it
should be owned and operated by only one local telecommunications
firm. The 1996 Act rejects that assumption, following the lesson of
Terminal Railroad and thus opting for what is in essence shared ownership of the local network. It is possible that, years from now, there will
still be only one infrastructure. But, even if that happens, under the
1996 Act there will at least be competition over the use of that infrastructure. Any firm can use the shared infrastructure to offer its own
unique mix of services and products, and each firm can add to that
shared infrastructure its own additional proprietary elements. Rejection
of the old approach—one infrastructure, one firm, one array of product

101 Id at 411.
102 Id at 405.

Lichtman & Picker

Entry Policy in Local Telecommunications

43

offerings—is thus the first significant difference between telephone
regulation before and after 1996.
B. Natural Monopoly and the Quarantine
Now for the second big change: from a regime where the entire local
market was regulated as a cohesive whole to a regime where regulations
attempt to target more narrowly specific network elements. Start in the
pre-1996 Act world. Even though a would-be entrant had no right to
enter the market, potential entrants did have a strong incentive to innovate with respect to local telephone infrastructure, products, and services. After all, if an entrant were to come up with some new innovation—say, caller ID—the incumbent might want to purchase it, since in
the incumbent’s hands the new technology could be lucrative. Granted,
the incumbent would likely be somewhat miserly in the negotiation,
knowing that the entrant has few other potential buyers. At the same
time, however, the incumbent would not want to be too miserly, since a
reputation for paying well would encourage other entrants to develop
new technologies, and those technologies might also be profitable in the
incumbent’s hands. Voluntary transactions, then, themselves created a
real incentive for would-be entrants to innovate, even prior to the 1996
Act.
So why did Congress intervene? Mainly because those voluntary
transactions served to benefit the incumbent at the expense of both consumers and the entrant. Focus first on consumers. Prior to the 1996 Act,
an incumbent might purchase new technologies, yes, but it would not
share its monopoly position with another firm. So while consumers did
enjoy some benefit from innovation in terms of getting access to new
products and services, consumers did not get one important possible
benefit: competition. If entrants had been allowed to use their innovations to enter the market, by contrast, innovation would have meant new
products and also lower prices. Now turn to the entrants. If a would-be
entrant came up with a new technology that created $200 in value, the
entrant would not keep the full $200. It would keep some, sure; but the
incumbent would capture some of that upside as well, since without that
there would be no reason for the incumbent to purchase the invention.
Thus entrants earned less of a reward—and therefore had less of an incentive to innovate—than they might have otherwise had.
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Now consider the world after the 1996 Act. Entrants who develop
new infrastructure, products, or services can enter the market without
the incumbent’s permission. The entrant might have to pay a regulated
fee to the incumbent for access to some UNEs; but, beyond that, the
entrant is free to use any new invention to compete with the incumbent.
That might mean that the entrant will earn more from its innovation
than it did under prior law, since this time the returns are not shared
with the incumbent. Or it might mean that the entrant earns less, since
competition between the incumbent and the entrant might drive prices
down. But, either way, the benefits of innovation now go to either the
entrant/innovator or consumers, instead of going in large proportion to
the incumbent.
Interestingly, the entrant’s incentive to innovate might be even
greater than the above analysis suggests. To see why, think about inferior technology. In the pre-1996 Act world, an entrant who came up
with some inferior technology had nothing to offer. There was no point
in reaching out to the incumbent and asking about a deal; the incumbent was not interested in buying technology that was inferior to its
own. For the entrant, this meant that investments in research paid off
only if the result was an actual improvement over existing technology.
Now jump to the world made possible by the 1996 Act. In this world,
an entrant who develops a technology superior to the incumbent’s clearly
has something of value. The entrant can sell it to the incumbent, or the
entrant can use it to enter the market. But—and here is the interesting
part—an entrant who develops an inferior technology can also in certain
settings enter the market. Yes, the incumbent will have a better product
or lower costs; but the entrant might still be able to compete, for example if market prices are far enough above both the incumbent’s and the
entrant’s total marginal costs. This artificially increases the entrant’s incentive to engage in research. Whereas before the only good outcomes
to research were ones where the resulting technology was superior to the
incumbent’s technology, now the entrant can benefit both when research
“succeeds” and, albeit to a lesser extent, even when research “fails.”
So far, we have focused on reasons why the approach to natural monopoly under the 1996 Act is an improvement over prior law. But there
are obviously drawbacks, too. Consider, for instance, the difficulties that
will arise every time the incumbent decides to change some basic element of the telephone network. If the incumbent owned the entire net-
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work—UNEs plus all other components—it could coordinate change. It
would have a sense of the full system-wide costs and benefits associated
with any upgrade, and it would be able implement any desirable upgrade
in a consistent manner. If components of the network are separately
owned, by contrast, change becomes more difficult. A company that
sells only end-user equipment, for example, will fight tooth and nail
against any network change that might decrease the value of its equipment, regardless of the overall costs and benefits to the system.103 Even
if that firm were to agree to a change, the costs of passing information
and otherwise coordinating an improvement would certainly be higher.
In short, bifurcated ownership creates bifurcated information and incentives; and there is something to be said for a market structure where,
instead, the telephone network is maintained and analyzed as a coherent
whole.
C. Natural Monopoly, Input Prices, and Output Prices
The third big change—in essence, the introduction of network element
pricing—is in many ways just a necessary ramification of the second.
That is, given that the 1996 Act regulates UNE by UNE instead of
lumping together the entire local telephone infrastructure, the government had to set prices for UNEs. This is actually the link between Iowa
Utilities and Verizon. Iowa Utilities is a fight over the scope of access;
Verizon is a challenge to the pricing rules that will apply however the
access issue shakes out. For better or worse, then, regulating “input”
prices was foreordained, at least if the narrower quarantine was going to
be meaningfully accomplished.
That said, there is no reason to either celebrate or lament this
change. Regulating input prices does not seem likely to be substantially
harder or easier than regulating output prices; both, it turns out, are
complicated and difficult to accomplish. The first problem is information. In United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph,104 the government argued that one reason to break up the then-dominant Bell Tele-

103 But see In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 FCC 2d 420,
424 (1968) (rejecting this same argument in a dispute over whether telephone handsets had to
be approved by the telephone company or could instead be supplied competitively).
104 552 F Supp 131 (DC Cir 1982).
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phone Company was that it was impossible for the government to regulate Bell effectively. Bell had all the information about the costs of providing various telephone services. The government was thus in the uncomfortable situation of setting policy and prices based on information
provided by the very firm it was trying to regulate. Worse, the government argued that Bell would intentionally keep itself in the dark about
some information, not gathering it so as to ensure that the government
could not use that information against Bell in regulatory proceedings.
The resulting argument was thus not the conventional claim that a monopolist was pricing excessively above cost or even predatorily below
cost; the government’s claim was that Bell was pricing without regard to
cost, and the government did not know enough about costs to intervene
effectively.105 That problem to some extent continues today, and it
seems to apply equally to both input and output prices.
A second and more significant problem stems from the complicated
relationship between prices and innovation incentives. If price regulation
were merely designed to keep prices low, regulation would be relatively
straightforward; the government can gather good information about
consumers’ willingness to pay for various telecom services, and the government would therefore be able to adopt relatively effective, aggressive
pricing measures if the only goal were to ensure that most consumers
can afford most telephone services. But the goal of price regulation is
significantly more complicated, as it is designed not only to keep prices
low for existing services but also to encourage firms to maintain quality,
minimize costs, and invest in new infrastructure. Accomplishing all that
is no easy task, even if price regulation just focuses on the output market.
Take one example: price cap regulation. Under this approach, the
government announces a maximum price that can be charged for some
service and further specifies how that price will change over time to account for expected efficiency gains, inflation, and so on. The idea is to
give the regulated party a strong incentive to minimize costs. If the
regulated firm can lower its costs, it can keep the extra profits for itself.
The government, meanwhile, can regulate in this fashion even without

105 Roger Noll and Bruce Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United States v
AT&T, in J. Kwoka and L. White, eds, The Antitrust Revolution 290, 295-326 (Scott, 1989).
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knowing very much about the regulated firm’s cost structure. The government just sets a price that seems reasonable given past prices and expected consumer demand, and the rest takes care of itself.
So far, so good. In practice, however, there are problems. First,
price cap regulation tempts firms to slash costs not only by increasing
efficiency but also by skimping on quality. That is, there are two ways to
increase profits under a price cap: one is to provide the same service at
lower cost, but the other is to provide worse service. Price cap regulation
might therefore ironically encourage firms to offer cheap, low-quality
service instead of more expensive, higher quality service. Second, because the government cannot credibly commit not to change the price
cap, the incentive to lower costs is in fact significantly weaker than at
first appears. If the regulated firm does a great job at cutting costs, there
is some chance that the government will renege on the deal and lower
the price cap. A regulated firm making a large profit and charging high
prices is just too easy a target.106 Conversely, if the regulated firm sees
its costs skyrocket, it is likely that the government will bail the firm out
by raising the price cap instead of, say, allowing the lone local telephone
provider to go bankrupt. Both of these responses undermine the incentive to cut costs. The upside to cost reductions is reduced since the government might recapture some of that savings for consumers, and the
downside to waste is also reduced since the government might allow the
firm to raise its prices if costs are overwhelming revenue.
Moreover, the details of the price cap regime alter these dynamics in
important ways. Consider again the possibility that firms will make “too
much” money under a price cap regime and that regulators will seek to
re-cut the deal afterwards. Individual firms would anticipate that and
would seek to avoid “excess” profits by spending more excessively. This
might lead to nice cars for firm executives, fancy offices, and so on. But
the incentive of individual firms to pull back on the profits throttle depends critically on whether the regulator sets policy at the firm level or
the industry level. If the price cap is altered at the firm level, the dynam106 To see the enormous instability associated with price cap regulation in practice, consider
the cases on price cap regulation as it applied to the interstate services of local telephone exchange companies: US Telephone Ass’n v FCC, 188 F3d 521 (DC Cir 1999); Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies v FCC, 79 F3d 1195 (DC Cir 1996); and National Rural Telecom Association v
FCC, 988 F2d 174 (DC Cir 1993).
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ics play out as we have indicated. If instead the price cap is based on
overall industry profits, individual firms may lack the incentive to cut
back. The firms in the industry face a collective action problem: their
individual decisions matter only at the margin for the industry outcome,
and, given that, they may as well make as much money as they can. Doing that, however, ends up hurting them all, because the regulator will
see those profits and react accordingly.
Overall, the point here is simply that price regulation is complicated
even when applied to outputs. It is therefore not the case that the 1996
Act moves regulation away from a type of regulation that has been very
successful and towards one that is more precarious. Price regulation is
difficult no matter whether it applies to inputs or outputs, mainly because both require the government to make educated guesses about costs
and incentives, two things about which the government understandably
knows very little. The main policy concern, then, might just be transition costs. That is, the strongest argument against the new pricing regime might simply be the cost of designing—and litigating over—a new
system. Beyond that, price regulation for inputs presents different complexities than those already familiar under price regulation for outputs,
but there is no reason to think that the one is any more difficult than the
other.
IV. The State of Entry in Local Telecommunications
We have covered a great deal of theory; it is thus here a good time to
pause and look at practical consequences, specifically some data relating
to the state of entry in local telecommunications. When a good business
can be made out of melting down millions of dollars in redundant telecommunications equipment to recover precious metals,107 we know that
serious mistakes have been made, though not necessarily that we could
have done any better. And so let us ask: what has entry looked like in
local telecommunications? Has the 1996 Act resulted in overinvestment

107 See Dan Roberts, Glorious Hopes on a Trillion-Dollar Scrapheap, Financial Times (Sept. 5,
2001). For more detail, visit the Shields Environmental website at <http://www.shieldse.com> (visited November 1, 2002).
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in local telecommunications, underinvestment, or in Goldilocks fashion,
did it get it just right?
As of December, 1999—roughly three years after the 1996 Act
went into effect—CLECs held roughly 4.3% of the market in end-user
switched access lines.108 By June 30, 2002, total lines had drifted down
slightly from roughly 189.5 million to 189.1 million, after peaking at
192.6 million at the end of 2000. Since December 1999, CLEC market
share has grown steadily, reaching 11.4% as of June 30, 2002. This entry
disproportionately targets medium and large businesses, institutions and
the government. As of mid-year 2002, incumbents had 78.3% of their
lines with residential and small business customers, while CLECs had
only 51.2% of their lines with these end-users.109
Of the roughly 21.6 million CLEC lines with end-users as of mid2002, 28.8%, or about 6.2 million, were CLEC owned; 50.5%, or about
10.9 million, were provided through UNE access; and 20.7%, or about
4.5 million were provided through the resale provisions of the Act. The
resale provisions, as you might recall, basically mean that the entrant is
buying service from the incumbent at regulated, wholesale rates and
then re-branding it for sale to end-users. Between December 1999 and
June 2002, the number of CLEC-owned lines more than doubled, but
actually dropped as a percentage of the total number of CLEC end-user
lines (from 33.2% to 28.8%).110
From the perspective of the incumbents, the direct burden of
CLEC access is growing. The number of resold lines purchased by
CLECs rose from roughly 1.7 million in December 1997 to 5.4 million
in December 2000 and then fell to 3.5 million as of June 2002.111 This
suggests that resale has become relatively less attractive. UNE access,

108 See FCC, Industry Analysis Division, Local Telephone Competition: Status as of June 30,
2002 at Table 1 (2002) (available online at <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/lcom1202.pdf>).
109 Id at Table 2.
110 Id at Table 3.
111 For those reading carefully, note that as of June 2002, while CLECs resell 3.5 million lines
from ILECs, total CLEC resales are at 4.5 million lines. The 1 million difference presumably
reflects lines resold from sources other than ILECs.

Lichtman & Picker

Entry Policy in Local Telecommunications

50

meanwhile, is growing rapidly. CLECs have gone from 133,000 UNEaccessed lines in December 1997 to 1.5 million in December 1999 to
11.5 million in June 2002. Still, the overall presence of CLECs on
ILEC premises is small: only 8.3% of all ILEC lines were being either
resold or accessed under the UNE provisions as of June, 2002.112
Not only is CLEC entry targeted on heavy users—large businesses
and the government—but, unsurprisingly, it focuses on dense population areas. As of June 2002, 33% of US zip codes had no CLECs and
another 19.5% had only one. Only 6.6% of US households actually live
in the zip codes without a CLEC, however, and another 9.1% of US
households live in zip codes with only a single CLEC entrant.113 This is
somewhat interesting, as it offers some sense of the costs of entry. Remember that CLECs were using their own lines only 29% of the time as
of June 2002, though, to be sure, they could have been using some of
their own facilities in conjunction with ILEC lines in the other 71% of
the cases. Still, the CLECs are not choosing to enter rural areas using
just the ILEC’s equipment, even though they obviously do a fair amount
of this in densely-populated areas. This suggests that some costs, such as
advertising costs and other brand-building expenditures, are best spread
over dense areas and that these costs are important in explaining the
pattern of CLEC entry.
In sum, after nearly seven years under the 1996 Act, CLECs have
about 11% of the end-user lines market, and, of that, roughly 71% of the
lines are owned by other carriers. Put differently, at least over the socalled last mile, CLECs provide service over their own lines for only 3%
of the market. The 7% of the market covered by CLECs using the lines
of others should be counted as at least a partial success for the Act, as in
some of those situations, the CLEC may be using some of its own facilities to provide telecommunications service.
All of this confirms what we instinctively knew, namely that the real
hot spot for consumers is not landlines, but cell phones. The competition in local markets that was to come from CLECs really seems instead
to be coming through wireless. Mobile wireless telephone subscribers
have jumped from roughly 79.7 million in December 1999 to 128.8 mil112 Id at Table 4.
113 Id at Table 12.
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lion in June 2002.114 In that same period, end-user switched access
landlines declined slightly, dropping from 189.5 million to 189.1 million. That looks like a declining market, especially as measured against
the December 2000 peak of 192.6 million lines. Market shares have
moved around during that period: CLECs added about 13.4 million
lines and ILECs lost about 13.8 million lines. But, obviously, the major
action is in cell phones, where carriers added 49.1 million cell phone
users during the same period.115 Now lines are a crude measure; we
might care more about market share as defined by the number of minutes used—that would be true for evaluating CLECs as well—but industry analysts believe that as many as 10 million landlines have been
displaced by wireless lines.116
What do these numbers mean for our questions? We said before
that we cannot assess how competitive a market is by the number of participants, so the fact that CLECs have an 11% market share tells us
nothing directly. The threat of entry itself might be significantly altering
incumbent incentives and market prices. Similarly, the fact that many
CLECs have entered and failed—more than 50 CLECs are reported to
have filed for bankruptcy117—does not tell us much either. It would
make no more sense to say that a drug company wasted the first ninetynine petri dishes when it turned out that the new blockbuster drug was
in the hundredth dish. The nature of research and development is substantial failure, and failure alone cannot be seen as equivalent to waste.
What of missing investment? It is almost impossible to quantify the extent to which incumbents may have been discouraged from either making new investments or repairing old investments, just as it is hard to
quantify how much new research is being done by entrants. It might also
be somewhat unfair to evaluate any of these numbers at this stage, since
entry and competition in the local market have throughout this period
taken place under the shadow of considerable legal uncertainty. That
114 Id at Table 11.
115 Id at Tables 1, 11.
116 FCC, Seventh Report, In the Matter of Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993; Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions
With Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, 17 FCC Rcd 12985 (2002).
117 Jeffrey A. Eisenach, The Real Telecom Scandal, Wall Street Journal (September 30, 2002).

Lichtman & Picker

Entry Policy in Local Telecommunications

52

uncertainty has been partially diminished, but as we will explain below,
even now there are clouds on the horizon.
V. Conclusion
The data presented in the previous section offer at least a partial answer
to the question of what the 1996 Act has actually accomplished thus far.
Here, let us conclude by asking the same question about the Court:
namely, after millions of dollars and several years of litigation, what have
the Court decisions in Iowa Utilities and Verizon actually accomplished?
The Court in Iowa Utilities accomplished a great deal, in that the
opinion both resolved many of the jurisdictional issues related to the
implementation of the Act and forced the Commission to more carefully articulate its understanding of the unbundled network element regime. Results followed quickly. In 1999, the Commission released new
regulations specifically designed to respond to the Court’s objections.
These new regulations “take into consideration alternatives outside the
[incumbent’s] network” and also consider “whether those alternatives are
actually available to the requesting carrier as a practical, economic, and
operational matter.”118 The new regulations unbundle only in instances
where a “lack of access” to the requested element “materially diminishes
a requesting carrier’s ability to provide the services it seeks to offer”119
and they emphasize in addition five relevant factors: the rapid introduction of competition in all markets; the deployment of new telecommunications infrastructure; reduced regulation; certainty in the marketplace;
and administrative practicality.120 In short, the new regulations respond
to all of the issues raised in Iowa Utilities.
Unfortunately, things have not gone well from there. In May 2002,
the DC Circuit vacated the Commission’s revised regulations.121 The
problem this time was that, except for two elements, the Commission’s

118 FCC, Third Report and Order, In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 15 FCC Rcd 3696, at ¶ 8 (1999).
119 Id at ¶ 51.
120 Id at ¶¶ 103-16.
121 United States Telecom Ass’n v FCC, 290 F3d 415 (DC Cir 2002).

Lichtman & Picker

Entry Policy in Local Telecommunications

53

rules applied “uniformly to all elements in every geographic or customer
market.”122 The D.C. Circuit found this inadequately justified, with the
court wondering why differences between the various markets—the
court’s main example is differences in state regulations, though there are
obviously economic differences as well—were not being accounted for in
the unbundling rules. Interestingly, this question mirrors one of the core
issues raised in Iowa Utilities, namely whether the Commission’s rules
have to account for the possibility of voluntary market transactions. The
similarity is that, in both instances, the basic dispute is over the extent to
which unbundling rules need to be sensitive to actual market conditions;
the Supreme Court wanted more sensitivity to the scope of available
voluntary transactions and self-provisioning, while the D.C. Circuit now
wants more sensitivity to any differences in each state's economic and
legal terrain.
In any event, the Commission is as of this writing back at work on
its rules. This is unfortunate in the sense that these continued iterations
have prolonged the process of implementing the 1996 Act and have increased the underlying legal uncertainty, two effects that have likely reduced overall investment in the local telecommunications market. But it
would be unreasonable to expect that the Court would anticipate all
possible interpretive issues related to the “necessary” and “impair” standard, and so it is hard to fault the Court for not spotting this issue back
in Iowa Utilities.
As for Verizon, the Court did resolve the dispute over TELRIC,
thus paving the way for the Commission’s pricing methodology to be
implemented in the states. Feedback from that process should help the
Commission adjust its methodology to better serve the goals of the 1996
Act, and of course implementation at the state level is the next big step
in terms of bringing the 1996 Act into full effect. Our concerns with
respect to the Takings Clause, by contrast, were left largely unresolved.
As we have pointed out, that is unfortunate; delaying the takings analysis likely means that the Takings Clause cannot serve what would have
been a valuable purpose, namely allowing the Commission to address
separately the distributional and efficiency issues implicated by access
pricing.

122 Id at 419.
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Ironically, then, while Iowa Utilities will for the next many years be
an important window through which regulators and industry participants will understand and evaluate both the 1996 Act and access rules
more generally, it is possible that Verizon is destined to quickly become a
footnote in the history of telecommunications regulation. The case
seems likely to have legs, if at all, as part of Takings Clause jurisprudence—not yet, and not for what it says or does, but for what it failed to
do and for the series of events implicitly put into motion by virtue of the
Court’s decision to postpone the takings issue.
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